Abstract: We formulate dynamic games which give a rationale to the firm size-wage effect that the sheer firm size increases wages. Suppose that the past wages are observable for large firms but not for small firms. Although the firms are physically identical, a large-firm game has many high wage equilibria which prevent turnover, while a small-firm game has the unique stationary equilibrium wage which is the minimum wage. The equilibria imply that workers form different expectations on the future wages in firms of different sizes and their search behavior influences equilibrium wages, which are supported by our empirical analysis. JEL classification number: C23, C73, D83, J30.
Introduction
The firm size-wage effect is a famous puzzle in economics. Larger firms pay higher wages, and this wage difference remains after controlling for work conditions, worker characteristics, or unionization (Lester, 1967; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Bayard and Troske, 1999) . In this paper we provide a game theoretic explanation of the firm size-wage effect and conduct empirical tests of our model and its equilibria.
The firm size-wage effect is called a puzzle because it is not consistent with traditional wage determination models. If the wage is a market clearing price, the worker and job characteristics should identify a single good and thus a single price should prevail. If the wage is a bid price that a firm sets, again the observable characteristics of job, worker, and union should determine the optimal wage(s). There may be multiple profit-maximizing wages, but there is no good reason for larger firms to choose a higher wage among them.
We propose that wages are strategically set by firms to control costly turnover. High wages are a direct cost for the firm but indirectly reduce the turnover cost. However, firms may not be able to commit to a long-term wage policy, and thus workers' search and turnover decisions depend on their expectations of future wages. The firm size can influence how workers form expectations of future wages. Suppose that large firms and small firms differ in the observability of the past wages: The past wages of large firms are known to all current and future workers, while only the current wages of small firms are known. Then the information that workers use when making expectations of the future wages is different for firms of different sizes. We show that the observability difference alone can generate the firm size-wage effect.
The observability difference changes the firms' strategies: Since the past wages of large firms are known by the workers, large firms should be careful about how their current wages affect future employee's expectations ("reputation" 1 ). Since only the current wage is known, small firms cannot influence future employee's expectations. We characterize the stationary wage equilibria 2 when workers are homogenous and firms differ only in the size/observability. A game between a small firm and workers has a unique stationary wage equilibrium in which the firm always pays the minimum wage. By contrast, a game between a large firm and workers has many equilibrium wages, including high wages up to the productivity of a worker (a competitive
The term "reputation" here means a trigger strategy. Our game has complete information and is thus different from the incomplete information models of reputation. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) .
2 For the precise equilibrium concept, see Section 2.2.
wage) or the highest outside offer a worker receives. Therefore, the firm size-wage effect is a combination of two different equilibrium wages for physically identical firms.
Our model is based on efficiency wage theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and assumes that a wage is an incentive device, not a price. We extend the ordinary one-shot efficiency wage model into a dynamic model for three reasons. First, multiple periods are necessary to incorporate turnover. Second, a firm may not be able to commit to a wage schedule over the entire future, thus we allow a firm to choose a wage every period. Third, a dynamic model clarifies that even if a firm has an opportunity to lower the wage in every period, it does not do so in a high-wage equilibrium. Thus the firm size-wage effect is persistent not because of a long-term commitment but because of repeated strategic choices.
There are other models using turnover to explain the firm size-wage effect. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) formulate a job market model with continuum of firms and workers. In their model each firm chooses a wage schedule over the infinite horizon to control turnover rate and the resulting number of employees. They show that there is a unique stationary wage equilibrium in which higher wage firms have more employees. Although payment of wages occurs over time in their model, there is only one decision node for a firm at the beginning. Coles (1998) modifies their model to allow firms to change wages in each period and shows that one of the resulting equilibria is the same as theirs. The explanation of the firm size-wage effect in these papers is that higher wage firms attract more workers and become larger. By contrast, we think the firm size is determined by the firm's production strategy, not the wage strategy, and the size affects the observability of its wage strategies. Since our rationale for the firm size-wage effect is new, we give it empirical support.
The firm size-wage effect equilibria in our model consist of firms' wage strategies and workers' search strategies. A large firm pays a high wage to reduce turnover rate and a small firm pays a low wage and suffers from high turnover rate. The empirical literature on the firm sizewage effect supports the firms' strategies. The workers' strategies, however, are crucial in our equilibria but have not been tested. In our firm size-wage effect equilibria, the workers form different expectations of future wages depending on the firm size and adjust their reservation levels accordingly. The observed wages are accepted offers that exceed the reservation levels of the workers. Therefore, we test whether the observed wages are influenced by the rational search of workers, who use firm sizes as signals of future wages as specified by our equilibria.
Since we cannot observe workers' search strategies directly, we estimate the effects on wage gains from job changes as indirect measures of reservation level adjustments. The wage gain is measured for individual workers and thus keeps worker characteristics constant. Therefore worker skill heterogeneity cannot explain a firm size effect on wage gains, while the commonly analyzed average wage levels include firm/worker heterogeneity effects.
If the firm size-wage effect holds according to our logic, a worker who searches in an industry with many firms that are larger than his current employer increases his reservation level, and hence the wage gain after an actual job change must be large. This implies that the distribution of firm sizes affects the wage gain (Hypothesis 1). The distribution of firm sizes is an opportunity set for a worker but has no influence of the labor quality or work conditions. Therefore, support for Hypothesis 1 is strong evidence that strategic job search affects observed wages.
Moreover, the wage gain can be affected by the sizes of the two relevant firms; the origin firm and the destination firm. If a worker moved from a small firm, there are many larger firms available and thus the wage gain is large (Hypothesis 2). If a worker moved to a large firm, the firm size-wage effect implies that his wage gain is large (Hypothesis 3).
Using a unique dataset that records detailed work histories of more than 3000 Norwegian men and controlling for the usual characteristics of workers and industries, we found support for these hypotheses. Moreover, a high proportion of job changes yielded large wage gains, which is additional evidence for rational job search. Our other empirical results are standard and consistent with the literature.
In sum, our theoretical contribution is to show that it is possible to have very different equilibrium wages for large firms and small firms, due to only the observability difference. Our explanation of the firm size-wage effect is that large firms build high-wage reputations thanks to their visibility in the job market and save turnover cost, while small firms are not visible and thus myopically pay the minimum wage. Our empirical contribution is to show an additional firm size-wage effect on wage gains consistent with our explanation of the firm size-wage effect on wage levels. We found that workers view a large firm as a better opportunity, and that the wages are equilibrium strategies, affected by workers' strategic search.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model (2.1), characterize equilibria with stationary wages (2.2), and derive testable hypotheses (2.3). In Section 3, we describe the method of the empirical tests and the data (3.1), and show the results (3.2). In Section 4, we conclude the paper by discussing the related literature and variations of the model, and suggesting how our model and results can be applied to other economic issues.
2. Job search games with observability difference
Model
We consider games between a firm and a sequence of workers it hires for a position in such a way that at any point of time t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., one person is hired. Multiple positions at the firm is a straightforward extension with the interpretation that the firm plays an independent game for each position. We consider two games; the large-firm game and the small-firm game. The firm size determines the observability of the firm's past wages as described below. Otherwise the two games are identical. All players have an infinite horizon and discount the future payoffs with factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Timing: At the beginning of the game, the firm has a worker in the position. To begin the first period, the firm offers a wage level w 1 (not less than the minimum wage w) for the next period, but also pays w 1 as the initial payment. Knowing the next period wage, the current worker decides whether to search for an outside offer (with cost s/(1 − δ) where s > 0) or not to search (with no cost). At the same time the worker produces a value v to the firm. An outside offer is assumed to be a stationary income sequence x, x, x, . . ., and thus is identified by the stage income x. In each period, if a worker searches, he can draw a value of x according to a cumulative distribution function F over a compact interval [w, w] with density f . F is fixed over time and the draw is independent over time. If the worker accepts a realized offer
x, x, x, . . ., he leaves the firm at the end of the period and starts receiving x thereafter, and the firm has to incur a cost c > 0 to hire and train a new worker at the beginning of the second period. With a new worker, the second period is just as the first period of the game. If the current worker did not quit, the next period starts with the same firm-worker pair and the firm pays the promised wage w 1 and makes a new promise w 2 ≥ w for the third period. Then the current worker chooses whether to search or not, and the game continues this way.
Past outside offers cannot be recalled, and a worker who searched does not necessarily accept the offer he got for that period. The workers have identical productivity v and outside offer distribution F . Figure 1 shows the timing of the actions and offers.
=== Insert Figure 1 about here. === Three remarks are in order. First, the form of the search cost s/(1−δ) is not necessary for the results, but we need the property that the search cost increases as the discount factor increases.
Otherwise when δ ≈ 1, the firm cannot prevent search, and the option of not searching loses the meaning. Second, the model is easily extended to include outside offers as non-stationary sequences of payoffs without changing the results. Third, the lower bound to the outside offers need not be the minimum wage if we interpret an outside offer as a general payoff.
Payoff: The firm's stage payoff (or one-period payoff) depends on whether it has a new employee and its wage offer in the past w t−1 and this period w t .
A worker's stage payoff at period t depends on the firm's past wage offer w t−1 , current offer w t (depending on whether he is a new employee) and whether he searches.
if he is a new employee and does not search
if he is a new employee and searches w t−1 if he is a continuing employee and does not search w t−1 − s/(1 − δ) if he is a continuing employee and searches.
Once he accepts an offer x, x, x . . ., his stage payoff is x thereafter.
The firm and workers maximize the total discounted expected payoffs over the infinite horizon; ∞ t=1 δ t−1 Π t for the firm and
x for a worker who started working at t = k and took an outside offer x, x, . . . at the end of t = T .
Common Information Structure: The firm and the workers know the payoff functions of all the players, workers' common outside offer distribution F , and the timing of the game.
Workers' search decisions and realizations of outside offers are assumed to be observable to only the relevant worker. Quit decisions are observable to the firm, but we assume that the firm does not change wages based on the predecessor's quit. The firm remembers its past wages.
These are common properties regardless of the size of the firm.
Difference in Observability:
The only difference between the large-firm game and the smallfirm game is the observability of the firm's past wages to the workers. If the firm is large, the entire history of the firm's wage offers is observable to the current and future workers, while if the firm is small, only the current offer is observable to the workers. This observability difference can be due to mass media, which usually reports large firms' behavior well while ignoring small firms, or former and current employees who spread the word on their employers' behavior. If the firm is large, it is likely that future workers have access to some information of the firm's past behavior.
Strategies: A strategy of a player in a dynamic game is a function that assigns an available action to each history, consisting of the observable past actions of all players at each decision node. Thus, the set of strategies for a firm is the same regardless of the firm size, but the set of strategies for a worker is different. A firm's strategy is a function that assigns a wage offer w t to the past wage history {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t−1 } for t = 1, 2, . . ., regardless of the size. (The first period history for a firm is degenerate.) A worker at a large firm observes a history of the past wages {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t−1 } in addition to his own search decisions in the past. Since no firm can change wages based on the workers' search behavior, however, we can focus on worker strategies that determine search and acceptance decisions only based on the firm's wage history {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t−1 } and the current offer w t . A strategy of a worker at a small firm is a function that assigns search and acceptance decisions to the current offer w t only.
This completes the description of two dynamic games. Apart from the information structure, all the characteristics of the games are the same.
We make four remarks regarding the model. First, the observability difference is not essential to our result except for the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium wage of the small-firm game.
The no observability assumption makes it impossible for a small firm to imitate a large firm.
Second, although we formulate separate games for a large firm and a small firm, the firms can be in the same labor market if they take other firms' wages as an exogenous offer distribution.
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Third, the initial payment for a new worker is not necessary for our result, but it warrants that no worker works for free even if he quits in the first period of employment. Fourth, the timing of the firm's wage promise and worker's search is essential to enable the firm to control turnover. If the firm sets only the spot wage and pays before a worker's search decision, it cannot control the quit rate.
Equilibria
We focus on equilibria with stationary equilibrium wages to examine the time-invariant firm size-wage effect. Although on the equilibrium path, workers expect the same wage forever after, the expectation after the firm changes the wages (an off-equilibrium path) plays a fundamental role to support the equilibria. It is natural to think that homogenous workers are paid the same starting wage, which is included in the stationarity of the equilibrium wage. As the equilibrium concept, we use a simple extension of sequential equilibrium: 4 At each information set (i.e., after each relevant history), the strategies by the firm and workers there and afterwards constitute a Nash equilibrium, that is, each player's strategy is optimal given the others' strategies. For clarity, we name this equilibrium as sequentially rational equilibrium. When the information is perfect, a sequentially rational equilibrium coincides with a subgame perfect equilibrium.
There is a potential problem of using a sequentially rational equilibrium, since workers at a small firm forget the firm's past wages. In games with imperfect recall, an optimal strategy at one point may not be optimal later. However, in our model, the past wages are already paid and therefore forgetting the past wages do not affect the optimal future strategies that maximizes the remaining part of the total payoffs.
The sequentially rational equilibria with stationary equilibrium wages are constructed as follows. First, notice that if an outside offer x, x, x, . . . is worth accepting, then any offer y, y, y, . . . such that y ≥ x is also acceptable. Thus the optimal acceptance decision has the reservation level property such that any offer not less than a reservation level is accepted.
This implies that if a worker expects that the firm will offer a stationary wage w, w, w, . . ., then an optimal strategy is either to search every period with a stationary reservation level (to be computed below), or never to search. (Proposition 1.) Second, given the workers' optimal strategy, we show that the minimum wage is the unique stationary wage supported by a sequentially rational equilibrium of the small-firm game. (Proposition 2.) Third, we characterize the set of stationary wages supported by sequentially rational equilibria of the large-firm game. There is an interval of equilibrium wages that are strictly larger than the 4 Sequential equilibrium is usually defined for finite games with perfect recall and incorporates consistent beliefs. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) . Our definition only requires sequential rationality. Consistency is important in games where the belief over the possible nodes in the current information set affects optimal continuation strategies. In our games the different nodes correspond to different histories of wages which are already paid. Hence an optimal continuation strategy is dependent only on the opponents' expected continuation strategies, and not the current node. minimum wage. Moreover, the payoff for a large firm is strictly larger in a high wage equilibrium than in the minimum wage equilibrium. (Proposition 3.) Therefore, the firm size-wage effect can be explained by a situation where a large firm chooses to be in a high wage equilibrium, while a small firm has no choice but to be in the minimum wage equilibrium. (Corollary.) In the rest of this section, we assume that the search cost for workers is not too large.
Proposition 1 holds for both the small-firm game and the large-firm game.
Proposition 1 : Take any relevant history where the firm offered a wage w ≤ w for the next period. Suppose that a worker expects that the firm will continue to offer w in the future. Then there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ, the worker's optimal strategy is: if w <ŵ δ , then always search with reservation level R(w), and if w ≥ŵ δ , then never search.
The critical level of the firm's future offerŵ δ is unique and satisfies
The reservation level R(w) satisfies
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1 : There exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ, w <ŵ δ < w.
Proposition 2 (Small Firm Game): For the small-firm game, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ,
(1) there exists a sequentially rational equilibrium in which the firm always offers w on the equilibrium path;
, then for any w > w, there is no sequentially rational equilibrium in which the firm always offers w on the equilibrium path.
For (1), we show that the following strategy combination is a sequentially rational equilibrium: the firm offers w after any history, and the workers search with reservation level R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w) if the current offer from the firm is w. The idea is that when the workers become patient (as δ becomes large), the reservation level R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w) is close to R(w). Then even if the firm offers a high wage for one period, it cannot reduce the quit rate significantly. Therefore the firm does not have an incentive to deviate. Workers are playing a best response against the firm's stationary offer by a similar logic to Proposition 1. For the uniqueness (2), we show that if any w > w is a stationary equilibrium wage, then the firm has an incentive to lower the wage. If the cost of turnover is not too large, the reduction of wage is more profitable than the expected loss from turnover.
By contrast, many wage levels including those aboveŵ δ are equilibrium wages if the firm is large. Note that a firm has no incentive to offer more than M in{v, w}.
Proposition 3 (Large Firm Game):
For the large-firm game, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ,
(2) for any w * ∈ [ŵ δ , M in{v, w}] and any c ≥ (
, there exists a sequentially rational equilibrium in which the firm always offers w * on the equilibrium path;
(3) for any w ∈ (w,ŵ δ ), there is no sequentially rational equilibrium in which the firm always offers w on the equilibrium path.
Moreover, the total payoff is larger in any equilibrium of (2) than in (1) for both workers and firms.
The minimum wage is supported by a similar strategy combination to the one in Proposition 2-(1). Each high wage in (2) is supported by a trigger strategy combination ("reputation equilibrium"): the firm offers w * and its workers do not search as long as the firm has never lowered the wage, but if the firm has ever lowered the wage, then the players go to the minimum wage equilibrium. Thanks to the observability of a large firm's past offers, this trigger strategy is available to the workers. If the players are patient (δ is large) and the turnover cost c is not so small, a large firm finds it more profitable to maintain a high wage and to prevent search than going to the minimum wage equilibrium. Any medium level wage in (3) induces some quits and the firm would deviate to the minimum wage. Hence Proposition 3 characterizes the set of all stationary wages supported by some sequentially rational equilibria. In case of M in{v, w} = v, the firm pays up to the productivity of a worker, i.e., the competitive wage.
The firm size-wage effect is a situation where a large firm chooses to be in a high wage equilibrium and a small firm is in the minimum wage equilibrium even if the firms are physically identical, i.e., have the same turnover cost. 
and therefore for any c in the above interval, the small-firm game with turnover cost c has a unique stationary wage w, while the large-firm game with turnover cost c has any wage w * ∈ [ŵ δ , w * * ] supported by a sequentially rational equilibrium.
Note that a large firm game always has the minimum wage equilibrium. However, it is more likely that a high-wage equilibrium is chosen, since the firm's total payoff is larger than in the minimum wage equilibrium. The implication that a large firm paying a high wage earns more profit than a small firm paying the minimum wage under the same worker productivity is consistent with the frequent finding (e.g., Abowd et al., 1999 ) that large firms and high wage firms have higher profit. The multiple high wage equilibria are consistent with the finding of Bayard and Troske (1999) that the size-wage premium can vary across industries.
Implications and Testable Hypotheses
We have shown that there are sequentially rational equilibria where large firms choose to pay higher wages than small firms in order to reduce turnover. The firms' equilibrium strategies have empirical support. The effect of the firm size on its own wage has been tested extensively (e.g., Lester, 1967; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Bayard and Troske, 1999) and the fact that large firms are concerned with their "image" or "reputation" is well-known. However, the workers'
equilibrium strategies have not been tested. Our equilibria imply that (i) workers form different expectations of future wages depending on the firm size and (ii) observed wages are accepted offers which are not less than the relevant worker's reservation level. Since the actual worker strategies are unobservable, we derive testable implications of (i) and (ii).
To measure the impact of workers' strategic search on wages, we focus on the individual worker's wage gains after job changes, i.e., the difference between the first wage at the new firm and the last wage at the previous firm. The wage gains keep worker characteristics constant.
This is important since some argue that large firms pay higher wages because they have higher quality workers, but such an argument does not explain firm size effects on wage gains of individual workers. With data of wage levels, it is difficult to distinguish whether the wage is determined by worker or firm characteristics or by a strategic choice.
Since the observed wages are accepted offers only, we derive effects on the average wage gain given that the offer exceeded the reservation level,
where w is the previous employer's wage and R(w) is the optimal reservation level from (2).
The content of an outside offer and its distribution have been kept unspecified so far. It is unrealistic to assume that a worker knows the exact distribution of wage offers. From the firm size-wage effect equilibria, however, we expect that a worker observes firm sizes and expects a position (a job) at a larger firm than his current employer to give a higher future wage. Based on this specification, we rewrite the expected wage gain. of the jobs in the industry at the wage w(z). A worker views each job as an opportunity. We can rewrite the expected wage gain with respect to the job distribution g;
where z * is the previous firm's size and r is the optimal reservation level in the firm sizes which satisfies (by rewriting (2) in terms of G)
Therefore the average wage gain W is influenced by the job distribution G and the previous employer's size z * , both of which are observable. Since the reservation level r is not observable, we look at the effect of the proportion of jobs at the firms larger than the previous employer
This measure is observable and correlates with z r g(z)dz positively and very closely. Note that the optimal reservation level r is at least the previous employer size z * because going to a smaller firm does not give a wage increase. Rational search with cost implies that r < z since getting an offer from a largest firm is very unlikely.
We divide the effect of changes in m on the wage gain W as follows. [Reservation Level Effect]: By differentiation, the reservation level (weakly) increases the average wage gain given m fixed;
[Effect on the Reservation Level]: As m increases, there are more jobs at larger firms in one's opportunity set, and thus the reservation level should increase. To see this, consider the changes in the left hand side of (3) when m increases ∆ units of z r g(z)dz. The first term w(r)[1−δG(r)] increases by δw(r)∆, while the second term −δ z r w(z)g(z)dz decreases by more than δ∆w(r). Thus the left hand side of (3) overall is decreasing in m. To equate both sides of (3), r must increase. That is, ∆r/∆m > 0.
Therefore the total effect (4) of m on the wage gain is positive, and our first hypothesis is;
[H1]: As the proportion of jobs at the firms that are larger than the previous employer increases, the wage gain after job changes increases.
We also test whether the wage gain from job changes is affected by the relevant firms' sizes.
In a job change, there are two firms involved: the origin firm from which a worker quit and the destination firm which the same worker entered. Let us show that the wage gain is negatively correlated with the origin firm's wage, and therefore with its size. The total differentiation 
for large δ's. Hence, as the origin firm's size increases, the wage gain decreases. An intuitive explanation of this effect is that when the previous employer is large, the next employer cannot be so much larger that a worker obtains a large wage gain by moving. Thus;
[H2]: Given the outside opportunity distribution, a worker moving from a large firm gets a smaller wage gain from job changes.
Finally, we test the destination firm size effect for two reasons. One is to confirm the firm sizewage effect at the individual level, instead of the well-documented average wage level: other things being equal, a worker gets a larger wage increase by entering a larger firm. The other is that we need to distinguish the effect of actually moving to a large firm and the effect of having many large firms in one's opportunity set (H1).
[H3]: Given the outside opportunity distribution and the previous employer size, a worker moving to a larger firm gets a larger wage gain from job changes.
Test 3.1 Method and data
The above predictions on the wage gain from changing jobs can be tested directly with data with multiple jobs per worker and the starting and ending wages of each job. Unfortunately, such data are rare since surveys tend to ask for the wages at a given date or when the job is entered (but not left). The best data with such a structure that we are aware of are the German and Norwegian Life History Studies, of which the data of Norwegian study are publicly available and are used here. These data have previously been used to study job changes, focusing on industrial (Stinchombe, 1979), age (Featherman and Sørensen, 1983) , and firm effects (Greve, 1994, Fujiwara-Greve and Greve, 2000) . The workers in these data were less likely to leave large firms than small (Greve, 1994) , which is a common finding that is consistent with our model. Firm size effects on wages do not appear to have been studied in these data, but have been studied with the similar German data and the same method that we employ (Hannan et al., 1990 ). They did not, however, test whether the proportion of jobs at firms larger than the current affected wage gains.
The data are a probability sample of over 1000 men in each of the 1921, 1931, and 1941 birth cohorts in Norway. Their work histories were coded from entry into the labor force until exit or the survey year 1971, giving multiple jobs per worker. Face-to-face interviews were used to collect work histories along with other important life events (education, marriage, children, and sickness). Although based on recall, this method of data collection has been shown to yield high-quality data (Carroll and Mayer, 1986) . Each observation has firm size and industry of the job and its starting and ending wages. The direct data on the wage increase reduce the need for controlling for worker characteristics, although we still control for education, experience, and the number of jobs held in the past.
The 1953 and 1963 census of establishments in Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 1953 , 1963 give the proportion of employees (jobs) in 9 size categories of establishments. 7 For workers who moved from small (< 5 workers) and medium (5-50 workers) firms, we computed the proportion of jobs in firms larger than the previous, and for workers who moved from large (> 50 workers) firms we entered the proportion of employees in firms larger than 200 workers.
7 The size categories were 1-2, 3-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200-499 , and over 500 employees.
Appendix B shows the definitions of the variables and their descriptive statistics. Note that the proportion of employees in the destination industry working for firms larger than the current firm has a mean of about 0.5 and a standard deviation of about 0.3, showing considerable variation. Note also that starting wages of the destination job are higher than the ending wages of the origin job, showing that workers benefit from moving. Both starting and ending wages vary considerably. The firm size-wage relation in Norway has been estimated to be lower than in the USA and comparable in size to Japan (Kalleberg and Van Buren, 1992 ).
We selected labor activity spells that started after 1950 to avoid the instability of the labor market caused by the war and its aftermath. We omitted jobs entered when the worker was under 18 years old, farm work, military, unemployment, partial employment, and self-employment, as well as jobs entered with an intervening period of unemployment, partial employment, or self-employment. We analyzed only jobs entered directly from other jobs because an intervening spell of unemployment reduces the wage in the destination job (Mincer, 1986) . Since the census did not report size distributions for public administration, postal service, education and health services, jobs in those industries are omitted. Though the data also show job changes within the firm, we only include job changes across firm. This leaves 7,010 job changes fulfilling our criteria. Of those, jobs entered from origin jobs in government or firms of unspecified size were excluded, leaving 5,087 job changes.
Of the events left, 2,916 had data on both origin and destination wages. Missing data on wages may cause sample-selection bias because the probability that a wage is reported may depend on the variables of our interest. This is controlled for by a Tobit type II model (Amemiya, 1985) where the selection equation and the regression equation have joint normal disturbances that may be correlated. That is, we jointly estimate a selection equation of the binary outcome y i (observation in sample) and the wage gain ∆w i = log(w i,d /w i,o ). The subscripts d and o are for the starting wage of the destination job and the ending wage of the origin job, respectively. The estimation model is: Table 2 contains analysis of subsets of the data defined by occupation or education level.
Because estimates of the selection equation are inefficient in such small subsets, the models in this table instead uses the Heckman (1976) two-step estimation procedure. In this procedure, the inverse Mills ratio φ(β x)/Φ(β x) is computed from the selection equation on the full data and added to the wage equation. Table 1 shows the results of analyses of wage gains due to change in jobs across firms. Moves across and within industries are pooled (but are separated later), and an indicator for acrossindustry moves is added. Since the measure of the proportion of jobs at larger firms in the industry affects both the reservation level and the probability that a large firm will be entered, this measure and the destination firm sizes are entered both singly and together. In model 3 where all are entered, the coefficient estimate of the proportion of jobs at larger firms shows its effect on the wage gain, net of the gain by moving into a large firm. In model 1 where destination firm sizes are omitted, it shows the gross effect of searching for jobs in a labor market with many jobs at large firms (the sum of the distribution effect and the benefit of entering a large firm).
Results
======Insert Table 1 about here.====== Consistent with hypothesis (H1), the proportion of jobs at firms larger than the origin firm shows a positive and significant estimate in the models 1 and 3. As one would expect, its magnitude is smaller when the destination firm size is controlled for. Consistent with hypothesis (H2), the origin firm size indicators have negative coefficient estimates, and they are always significant for large firms. Medium origin-firm estimates are significant only in model 2, when the proportion employed in larger firms is omitted. This confirms that the benefit of changing firms is smaller when the origin firm is large. The estimates for large destination firms support hypothesis (H3) when the proportion of jobs at larger firms is omitted from the equation, but falls to marginal significance when the proportion of jobs at larger firms is included. Thus, in the model entering variables for the proportion of jobs at larger firms and the origin firm size, the destination firm size effect on wage increases is nearly absent. The job distribution effect seems to account for a large part of the observed wage gain from changing firms. Since Norway has national unionized wage bargaining, it is a strong finding that the wage gains are so heavily influenced by workers' search.
Apart from these main findings, we also see from Table 1 that the intercept and the number of previous jobs have significant estimates. The positive intercepts show an expected gain from job changes regardless of firm sizes. In our data, 72.7% of the moves have positive wage gains and 53.0% have a wage gain of 5% or higher. The significant wage increase from job changes strongly suggests that workers conduct rational search. The negative effect of the number of previous jobs suggests that workers with frequent job changes neglect to build up human capital (Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981) . Another possible source is personal reputations. Since workers with frequent moves may be suspected of leaving soon, their wage gains may become smaller.
Estimates of the effect of origin and destination firm size on wage gains from mobility are rarely done, but the negative coefficients of origin firm size and positive coefficients of destination firm size parallel findings by Hannan et al. (1990) , who used the German lifehistory data. In sum, the findings support our theoretical predictions that wage gains are greater when the worker is (H1) entering an industry with many jobs at firms larger than the origin firm, (H2) leaving a small firm, and (H3) entering a large firm.
The above analysis pooled data on workers in different jobs and with different educational backgrounds. It is of some interest to investigate whether the findings on job distribution and firm size effects are similar across subsets of workers, as some argue that worker opportunities vary substantially by worker characteristics. To this end, we conducted analysis of wage gains with more homogeneous subsets of the data. Table 2 contains analyses of the wage gains from job moves on subsets defined by whether the worker changed industry, by education level, by origin firm size, and by blue or white collar work. The control variables of these analyses are the same as in Model 1, but their coefficient estimates are omitted to conserve space. The number of observations differ substantially among these data sets, and are given next to the coefficient estimates. In particular, the university educated workers, small origin-firm workers, and white-collar workers are small subsets.
======Insert Table 2 about here.======
The effect of the size of the origin firm have rather similar estimates across these data sets.
The general conclusion is that leaving large firms is worse than leaving medium-size firms. The reference variable (which has zero coefficient by definition) is small origin firm, thus leaving small firms gives the greatest wage gains. For most of the subsets, the coefficient for large origin firms is significant but the coefficient for medium-size firms is not. Insignificance in small datasets could be due to a low number of observations and thus should not be interpreted.
However, the subset of within-industry mobility has sufficient observations, hence we take the results as suggesting that origin firm size has lower (and perhaps no) effect on wage changes for workers who move within an industry. This may be because both workers and firms can evaluate each other well within an industry, which reduces the firm size effect on wage gains.
Our model of search based on firm size fits better with across industry moves, where close evaluations of workers and firms are difficult.
The proportion of jobs at firms larger than the origin firm has the predicted sign and is significant for most large subsets. For within-industry moves, we again interpret that workers can evaluate firms in detail rather than by heuristic measure of firm size. Overall the findings are supportive of our theoretical predictions also in these more homogenous subsets of the data.
Discussion and conclusion
We have shown that the equilibrium firm size-wage effect obtains with workers and firms that are homogenous except for the observability of firm behaviors. A small firm is not visible in the job market, and thus behaves myopically to offer the lowest wage possible. By contrast, a large firm is visible in the labor market so that it can either maintain a high wage and induce the expectation of a high wage from current and future workers, or lower the wage, collapse the good expectation, and go to the minimum-wage equilibrium. When the turnover cost is not so small, it is more profitable to maintain a high wage and prevent turnover. Therefore, we made a clear link from the firm sizes to the equilibrium wages via firms' visibility in the job market and workers' strategic job search.
We also provided empirical support to our firm size-wage effect equilibria, and showed an additional firm size-wage effect. Our empirical findings are (1) the distribution of jobs at large firms increases wage gains after job changes, (2) the origin firm size decreases wage gains, and (3) the destination firm size increases the wage gains. The job distribution reflects workers' opportunity set but is not incorporated as a wage determinant in ordinary models of wages as prices. Thus finding (1) not only supports our equilibrium prediction but also gives evidence to efficiency wage and search theory in general. Findings (2) and (3) reinforce the firm size-wage effect by showing the effect on wage gains instead of wage levels.
Both our theoretical result and the evidence are new, so we relate our work to the literature.
Our rationale for the firm size-wage effect differs from that of other dynamic models of turnover (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Coles, 1998) . As we discussed in the introduction, in those models, a firm chooses the wage levels and indirectly its size, while in our model, the firm size is determined by the firm's strategy in the product market and the wage policy is affected by the size. Thus the causality of the firm size-wage effect is the opposite.
The key insight of our equilibrium wage differential is that it is profitable to have a high-wage reputation, but small firms cannot build a reputation due to the lack of the visibility. While a reputation model is rare in the literature of wage determination, other areas of economics have models that take into account reputations. Models of durable good producers (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Section 5.3.1. and references therein) formulate that although each consumer purchases a durable good only once, their decision depends on the producer's past record. Thus a firm cannot produce poor quality and attract future customers. Wernerfelt (1988) shows that a firm can use the brand name established in other market to build reputation for a new experience good.
Our empirical analysis is one of a few studies of wage gains, but our results on origin and destination firm size are consistent with Hannan et al. (1990) who used German data. They did not test any distribution effect on wage gains. We are not aware of empirical research on the effect of outside opportunity distribution of workers on the firm's strategy. Brewer (1996) found that the average wages of teachers in school areas affect their mobility to enter or leave a school area, showing that the outside opportunities seem to matter for mobility.
Our work is also one of a few empirical tests of game models. It is difficult to test game models because (a) many unobserved off-equilibrium behaviors are crucial in supporting an equilibrium and (b) it is difficult to show whether some variables are strategically chosen to pursue the objective that a game specifies. We overcame (a) by using the conditional wage gain and (b) by showing the effect of outside opportunities which strongly suggests that the wages are not unilaterally set by firms, nor as a market clearing price, but are equilibrium strategies determined by both the firm's profit maximization and the workers' strategic job search.
Next we discuss variations of the model.
(i) Unlike many other labor models, we have no worker skill difference or effort choice. This was done deliberately to obtain the result with few assumptions, since the equilibrium wage differential is easier to derive from models with heterogeneity. A model where a large firm can induce higher level effort and/or attract high quality workers by its high wage has more incentives to maintain the reputation equilibrium than ours. However, the firm size-wage effect on wage gains cannot be derived from worker heterogeneity alone.
(ii) Our model, like many job search models, has search by workers only. It can be extended to include firm's search for workers and to have multiple firms. Fujiwara -Greve (1999) shows that trigger strategies similar to the one in Proposition 3 can constitute a Nash equilibrium of a market game where many firms and workers search simultaneously.
(iii) The observability assumption was made to give a clear difference in the equilibria. Neither full observability for large firms nor unobservability of small firms is necessary for the existence of equilibria where a large firm pays a higher wage than a small firm. It suffices to punish a large firm's deviation for long enough periods, and thus the observability can have limited horizon. Even under full observability, the minimum wage is the unique stationary equilibrium wage if workers at a small firm do not take past wages as signals of future wages.
(iv) The multiplicity of the high-wage equilibria can be solved by adding a negotiation between the large firm and workers. The high-wage no-search equilibria are all efficient within a firmworker pair, since search and turnover are costly and the wage transfer is canceled out. On the other hand, the minimum wage equilibrium has both search and turnover cost, which implies ex ante inefficiency. Therefore, a negotiation between a large firm and its workers is likely to choose a high wage equilibrium.
Finally, we note that there are many economic issues that can be addressed within our framework. Repeat purchases of commodities have essentially the same structure where the firm is the seller and consumers are buyers (as opposed to the firm-worker model) and the repeat purchase decision depends on the firm's reputation. It is worthwhile to investigate whether the firm size has an impact on repeat purchases. Parents' school choices for their children and households' choices of residential areas also depend on reputations, since they cannot see the actual quality before the choice of a school or an area, and they can move out. It is valuable to investigate the sources and consequences of reputation in these contexts.
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, note that Assumption 1 and the fact that the left hand side of (1), δ w y (x − y)f (x)dx, is strictly decreasing in y imply thatŵ δ exists uniquely for sufficiently large δ's.
Under the stationary expectation, a worker's optimization problem is a stationary discounted dynamic programming problem, which has a stationary optimal solution (see Kreps, 1990 Appendix Two). We will show (A) the value function of the stationary search strategy with a reservation level R, (B) the optimal reservation level that maximizes the value function, (C) the condition under which not searching in any period is optimal, and (D) the condition under which stationary search is optimal.
(A) Value function under search: Suppose that the firm offered w and is expected to offer w forever after. The value function (the total expected discounted payoff) when the worker searches every period and accepts any offer not less than R is computed as follows. (Note that the reservation strategy is optimal because of the stationary outside offers.) If the worker searches, he incurs the cost −s/(1− δ). If an offer x ≥ R arrives, he takes it and starts receiving x from next period on. The total future expected payoff of this case is w R x/(1 − δ)f (x)dx. If the offer was less than R (with probability F (R)), the next period is just like this period with the initial payment w. Let V (w, w ∞ ) be the total expected payoff with initial payment w and the future wage offers w, w, , . . .. Then it satisfies
Therefore the total future payoff at the search decision node is
One can solve (5) and plug in (6) to obtain the explicit form of V S (w ∞ ).
(B) An optimal reservation level is R that maximizes V S (w ∞ ). Since V S (w ∞ ) and V (w, w ∞ )
differ only in the first constant term, we differentiate V (w, w ∞ ) to find the optimal R. It is easy to show that the first order condition ∂V/∂R = 0 is necessary and sufficient to determine the optimal reservation level, and the first order condition is equivalent to V (w, w ∞ ) = R/(1 − δ).
By rearranging, we obtain (2).
the left hand side of (2) as
By differentiation, is strictly increasing in R. Thus it suffices to show that (w) < (1−δ)w−s < (w). Plugging in R = w we obtain
for large δ's by Assumption 1. Moreover,
Hence there is a unique optimal reservation level R(w).
(C) We prove that when the firm's stationary offer satisfies w ≥ŵ δ , then the optimal strategy is not to search in any period by showing that a one-step deviation does not give a larger total payoff. This is sufficient thanks to a result of bounded discounted dynamic programming problems. (See Kreps 1990, Appendix Two Proposition 4.) Suppose that the firm just offered w and offers w, w, . . . forever after. The value of the nonsearch strategy is (δw)/(1 − δ) at the search decision node. If the worker deviates and searches for one period with a reservation level R * , and goes back to non-search strategy afterwards, the value is
By differentiation, the optimal reservation level after a deviation is w. Letting R * = w in D and using (1), we get
Hence as long as w ≥ŵ δ , it is optimal not to search.
(D) Suppose that the expected stationary wage is w <ŵ δ . Then the constant search strategy with the optimal reservation level R(w) gives the value V S (w ∞ ) with R = R(w). If a worker deviates and did not search for one period and goes back to search afterwards, the value is D = δV (w, w ∞ ), with R = R(w). Hence a deviation is not beneficial if
This is equivalent to R(w) ≥ w. From (2), the optimal reservation level R(w) is not less than
Proof of Remark 1.
By differentiation, the left hand side of (1), δ w y (x − y)f (x)dx, is strictly decreasing in y. Assumption 1 implies that when y = w, the left hand side is larger than s for large enough δ.
Thus for large enough δ's,ŵ δ satisfiesŵ δ > w. When y = w, δ w y (x − y)f (x)dx = 0, thus s > 0 implies thatŵ δ < w.
The following is useful in the later proofs.
Lemma 1: As δ converges to one, the optimal reservation level R(w) from (2) converges to the unique R * * which satisfies
Moreover w < R * * < w.
Proof of Lemma 1.
As δ → 1, the left hand side of (2) converges to * (R) := R(1 − F (R)) − w R xf (x)dx while the right hand side of (2) converges to −s. By differentiation, * is strictly increasing in R. By Assumption 1, * (w) = w − w w xf (x)dx < −s which implies that the solution R * * to * (R) = −s strictly exceeds w. Since * (w) = 0, the solution to * (R) = −s is strictly smaller than w.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(1) We show that, for sufficiently large δ's, the following strategy combination is a sequentially rational equilibrium: the firm offers w after any history, and the workers search with reservation level R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w) if the current offer from the firm is w.
To prove the above we show (A) after any history, the workers' strategy is optimal given the firm's strategy, for large δ's, and (B) after any history, the firm's strategy is optimal given the worker's strategy for large δ's.
(A) Take a history where the firm has just offered w. Given the firm's strategy, the future offers are w, w, . . .. By Proposition 1, the optimal reservation level from next period on is R(w). Hence the (optimal) value from the next period on is
where V (w, w ∞ ) is defined by (5) with w = w and R = R(w), and hence
The last equality uses the first order condition V (w, w ∞ ) = R(w)/(1 − δ).
In the current period, if the worker searches with reservation level y, the value is
By differentiation, the optimal reservation level is y = R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w). Thus the reservation level in the suggested strategy is optimal.
If he deviates for one period and does not search but conforms to the constant search strategy from the next period on, the value is D = δV
dx is strictly decreasing in z, it suffices to show that y ≤ŵ δ for large δ's.
By rearranging (2) with w = w, we have
From Lemma 1, for large δ's, R(w) > w and hence the left hand side of (7) is strictly larger than s. This implies that R(w) <ŵ δ for large δ's. Moreover, for large δ's, y is close to R(w) and thus y ≤ŵ δ .
Therefore there exists δ * ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ * , V S (w, w ∞ ) ≥ D, i.e., the worker does not deviate to no-search.
(B) We show that the firm does not deviate from constant w, w, . . . for one period. When the firm has a new employee, if the firm follows the constant offer strategy w, w, . . ., the total expected discounted payoff Π(w ∞ ) satisfies
On the other hand, if the firm offers w > w for this period, it can reduce the quit rate by pushing up the worker's reservation level to y := R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w). With probability 1 − F (y), the worker quits and it will start offering w from next period and the continuation value is Π(w ∞ ) − c. If the worker stayed this period, the firm pays w next period instead of w, and then conforms to offering w, w, . . .. Thus the value of one-period deviation to offering w > w is
Lemma 1 implies that as δ becomes large, both y and R(w) converge to R * * and thus the right hand side of the above inequality goes to zero. Hence there exists δ * * ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
e., the firm does not deviate when it has a new employee.
Take any history where the firm offered u in the previous period and the worker did not quit. Then this period payment is u. The stationary wage w, w, . . . gives
If the firm offers w > w for one period and then conforms to w, w, . . ., the total expected discounted payoff is
Hence there exists δ * * * ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ * * * , the firm does not deviate.
(2) We show: (C) the firm deviates from any other stationary wage w <ŵ δ , and (D) the firm deviates for one period if w ≥ŵ δ is a stationary equilibrium wage for some sequentially rational equilibrium (i.e., a contradiction).
(C) Suppose that the firm offers a stationary wage w ∈ (w,ŵ δ ). By Proposition 1, the workers always search with reservation level R(w), thus the firm's value function is
By differentiation, this is a decreasing function of w for sufficiently large δ's. Thus the firm would deviate to w, w, . . ..
(D) Suppose thatŵ δ is offered in every period of a sequentially rational equilibrium (on the equilibrium path). This implies that after observingŵ δ , any worker believes that the firm will continue offeringŵ δ , but we have not restricted the belief on an off-equilibrium path.
Consider one-period deviations. By a similar logic to (B), there exists δ * * * * < 1 such that for any δ ≥ δ * * * * , deviating to w ∈ (w,ŵ δ ) is not better than deviating to the minimum wage.
Thus consider that the firm deviates to the minimum wage for one period and then returns to the stationary wageŵ δ in the next period. The optimal timing of deviation is when the firm has a newly hired worker to save the initial payment. The worst case for the deviant firm is that workers expect the minimum wage forever after and lowers their reservation level to R(w). But if the firm goes back toŵ δ in the next period, the worker start expectingŵ δ again since he cannot tell whether the firm has deviated in the previous period. This means that if the current worker quits, the firm's continuation value from next period on is the same as if nothing happened, i.e., Π(ŵ Finally, note that for any stationary wage w >ŵ δ , the firm's value function is Π(w ∞ ) = (v − w)/(1 − δ) < Π(ŵ δ ) = (v −ŵ δ )/(1 − δ). Thus it suffices to check the case thatŵ δ is the stationary wage. In sum, when the turnover cost is not more than the above bound, the unique stationary wage is w. Lastly let δ = M ax{δ * , δ * * , δ * * * , δ * * * * }.
Suppose that the firm has a continuing worker and let u be the payment of this period. If the firm follows the high-wage strategy w * , w * , . . ., the total payoff is v − u+δ(v − w * )/(1− δ).
Thus, the high-wage strategy is better than one-period deviations if and only if Significance levels from two-sided tests are denoted by symbols = (p<.10), * (p<.05), and ** (p< 01).
